Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Jacopo Bizzotto
Author-Name-First: Jacopo
Author-Name-Last: Bizzotto
Author-Workplace-Name: Oslo Business School - OsloMet
Author-Name: Eduardo Perez-Richet 
Author-Name-First: Eduardo
Author-Name-Last: Perez-Richet 
Author-Workplace-Name: Sciences Po
Author-Name: Adrien Vigier
Author-Name-First: Adrien
Author-Name-Last: Vigier
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Title: Communication via Third Parties 
Abstract: We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information with an eye to the continuation game, and incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. We provide a methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal.
Classification-JEL: C72, D82
Creation-Date: 2020-06-10
File-URL: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530804
File-Format: text/html
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530804
Keywords: Information Design, Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, Information Acquisition
Handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202006