Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Jacopo Bizzotto
Author-Name-First: Jacopo
Author-Name-Last: Bizzotto
Author-Workplace-Name: Oslo Business School - OsloMet
Author-Name: Adrien Vigier
Author-Name-First: Adrien
Author-Name-Last: Vigier
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Title: Optimal School Design
Abstract: We consider a population of students with heterogeneous characteristics, and examine the dual design problem consisting of (a) allocating students to schools and (b) choosing how to grade students in school, with a view to optimizing students' incentives to work hard. We show that any optimal school design exhibits stratification, and more lenient grading at the top-tier schools than at the bottom-tier schools. Our results highlight a novel trade-off between the size of the pie and its equal division in the context of school design.
Classification-JEL: D02, D82, D86
Creation-Date: 2021-06-30
File-URL: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3877063
File-Format: text/html
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3877063
Keywords: Education, Moral Hazard, Grading, Peer Effects, Stratification
Handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202103