Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Jacopo Bizzotto
Author-Name-First: Jacopo
Author-Name-Last: Bizzotto
Author-Workplace-Name: Oslo Business School - OsloMet
Author-Name: Eduardo Perez-Richet
Author-Name-First: Eduardo
Author-Name-Last: Perez-Richet
Author-Workplace-Name: Sciences Po
Author-Name: Adrien Vigier
Author-Name-First: Adrien
Author-Name-Last: Vigier
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Title: Communication via Third Parties
Abstract: A principal designs an information structure and chooses transfers to an agent that are contingent on the action of a receiver. The principal faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, designing an information structure maximizing non-monetary payoffs, and on the other hand, minimizing the information rent that must be conceded to the agent in order to implement the information structure which the principal designed. We examine how this trade-off shapes communication. Our model can be applied to study the relationship between, e.g.: political organizations and the public relations companies that campaign on their behalf, firms and the companies marketing their products, consultancies and the analysts they employ.
Classification-JEL: C72, D82
Creation-Date: 2021-03-05
File-URL: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530804
File-Format: text/html
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530804
Keywords: Information Design, Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, Information Acquisition
Handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202106