NJCIE 2018, Vol. 2(2–3), 39–55
http://doi.org/10.7577/njcie.2757
The
Principle of Singularity: A Retrospective Study of How and Why the Legislation Process
behind Sweden’s Education Act came to Prohibit Joint Leadership for Principals
Marianne Döös[1]
Professor,
Department of Education, Stockholm University, Sweden
Lena Wilhelmson
Associate
professor, Department of Education, Stockholm University, Sweden
Jenny Madestam
PhD,
School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, Sweden
Åsa Örnberg
PhD,
Department of Law, Stockholm University, Sweden
Abstract
This paper provides insight into the
legislative process behind the current Education Act of Sweden. The aim is to
shed light on how and why it came to prohibit joint leadership for principals.
Joint leadership is a sub-form of shared leadership between managers
characterised by complete formal authority, hierarchic equality and merged work
tasks. The sharing of a principal’s position is, in previous research,
identified as potentially favourable for principals and schools as it decreases
principals’ often heavy workload. Five retrospective interviews were done with
people involved in the legislative process. The analysis points out both
distrust in the governing line and uninformed notions of leadership among
legislators as explanations behind the prohibition. In the legislative work,
joint leadership was at most a marginal issue. Thus the legal prohibition was
an unintended side-effect, yet completely in line with traditional and
uninformed notions of leadership. The principle of singularity ruled and joint
leadership was extinguished for principals without considering whether this
favoured or harmed the overarching aims of the Education Act: increased
pedagogical responsibility and leadership with a focus on the students’
learning, results and democratic upbringing.
Keywords: education act; principal; school unit; shared
leadership
When
Sweden’s current Education Act (2010:800) became operative
in 2011, the collaborative form of joint leadership[2]
was extinguished for principals. Could this be the result of deliberate
consideration among legislators or was it a consequence of unreflective
notions? The act explicitly states the principle of singularity in that there
must be a person with the title of principal in each so-called school unit and
that this principal must be one person. The reason behind this paper is that
the law stands in sharp contrast to the identified benefits of joint leadership
between managers, including school principals (e.g., Brooking, Collins, Court, & O'Neill, 2003; Court, 1998; Döös, Wilhelmson, Madestam, &
Örnberg, 2017a; Rosengren
& Bondas, 2010; Thomson &
Blackmore, 2006). The identified problems concerning principals’
working conditions (SOU, 2015:22),
together with research-based knowledge about shared leadership between
managers, point to an increase in the relevance of collective ways of
organising the position of principal (Döös et al., 2017a). By means of a
retrospective interview study this paper aims to shed light on how and why the
legislative process came to prohibit joint leadership for principals; thus,
focusing leadership and organising for education. The paper points out both
distrust in the governing line and uninformed notions of shared leadership
among legislators. Two research questions are used to uncover the reasons
behind the prohibition: How is the work process behind the 2010 Education Act
described? Which aspects emerge as significant in understanding how and why
prohibition came into existence? The first question was chosen as the extent of
the work process emerged as important for not paying attention to alternative
forms of leadership. The second question was chosen to identify both explicit
and implicit reasons. The paper does not advocate any specific solution or
model but seeks to grasp why one useful way of organising is no longer legal.
In the late
1980s and early 1990s, there was a wave of decentralisation in Swedish public
management. Power and responsibility were formally transferred from the
government to the municipalities (Feltenius, 2011; Strandberg, 2015). This change took place
in many parts of the Western world (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). One change in
Sweden was that the schools became a municipal responsibility, meaning that the
municipality became the responsible organiser for the schools and their
employees (Jarl, 2012; Prop., 1990/91:18). Twenty
years after this municipalisation, the Swedish parliament passed a new
Education Act (2010:800)
with fairly extensive state regulation of Swedish schools that partially
recentralised the school system (Örnberg, 2016).
Of relevance for this paper, is that the act, among other things, details the
responsibilities of school principals, introduces the concept of the school
unit and stipulates that each school unit shall have only one principal.
These changes to the law removed the legal opportunities for joint principalship
in Sweden (Örnberg, 2016).
The Education Act establishes that each principal[3] makes decisions about his or her
unit’s inner organisation and is responsible for allocating resources within
the unit according to the children’s and students’ abilities and needs (2
Chapt. 10 §).
Responsibility
for schools in Sweden is divided between several actors: the state, the
organiser[4] and the principal in a governing line (SOU, 2015:22). The municipal organiser is a
political committee and its local administration manages the operative control
of the municipal schools. Schools are publically financed. School budgets
depend on the number of students choosing and attending the school. Apart from
the requirement of only one principal per school unit, the state gives
organisers and principals autonomous power over their schools, resulting in a diversity
of organisational models and leadership forms (Döös et al., 2017a).
The work
involved in producing a new school law was lengthy; it was interrupted during one
government but was taken up again after a change of governments in 2006. Work
went on during two main periods of time and in different forms: a parliamentary
inquiry and an internal departmental working group (see table 1).
|
The legislative process 1999–2011 |
Social Democrat
minority |
In 1999 the School Law
Committee (also called the Parliamentary Inquiry) was appointed, which
produced the official report entitled: |
Non-Socialist majority
government |
In 2006 an internal working
group was appointed, which presents the Department’s proposal: |
Collective
leadership is an umbrella term for shared responsibility in an organisation and
consists of two distinct but connected subsets: distributed leadership with
responsibility and power being spread, to those not in management positions (Jones, 2014; Liljenberg, 2018; Spillane, 2005), and
shared leadership between managers (Döös, 2015;
Eckman, 2018). The latter
belongs to the research stream “pooling leadership capacities at the top to
direct others” (Denis,
Langley, & Sergi, 2012, p. 213). The collective nature of
leadership is increasingly in focus in the research literature (Bolden, 2011; Gronn, 2015) and shared
leadership between managers is part of this trend, in school settings too (Döös et al., 2017a; Eckman, 2018). Formal
authority-sharing by two people is described as a way of decreasing principals’
often overwhelming burden of work (e.g., Court, 2003; Döös et al., 2017a). The isolation that can be
felt by principals (Kelchtermans,
Piot, & Ballet, 2011) is contrasted with the sense of
reassurance and collective responsibility in leadership shared between
principals: “coprincipals value not being alone at the top” (Eckman, 2007, p. 26).
Shared
leadership here
implies close cooperation in which the managers involved have and/or take
shared responsibility for an organisational unit (Döös, Wilhelmson, & Backström, 2013; Döös et al., 2017a). Based
on work organisation theory (e.g.,
Bratton, 2010) such shared
leadership has been conceptualised in relation to formal organisational
hierarchy (de Voogt
& Hommes, 2007; Döös, 2015;
Wilhelmson, 2006) (see
Figure 1).
Joint
leadership
(Wilhelmson, 2006) is characterised by complete formal authority, hierarchic
equality and merged work tasks. The sharing managers work on the principle that
their managerial activities are in common and they alternate in taking on
tasks. Before the current Education Act came into force, two principals for one
and the same school could each have the formal authority and thereby also take
responsibility on the basis of their formal equality (Wilhelmson & Döös, 2018). Functionally
shared leadership (Döös, 2015) also implies formal hierarchic equality, but
those who share leadership carry out the work within different main functions
of the activity (e.g.,
Bratton, 2010). The managers have mutual responsibility for the
activities in general, but their mandates are separate. Invited leadership
(de Voogt & Hommes, 2007)
implies a formal hierarchy between those who share responsibility; it is the
person who has formal authority who invites the other person to take shared
responsibility in practice.
Successfully
sharing managers in all forms highlight three qualities that form the internal
bedrock of sharing: trust, lack of pretention and common values (Döös, 2015; Döös et al., 2017a).
Common values constitute a foundation for the building of mutual trust and
concern the goal and vision for the activity as well as how to lead and treat
human beings, two equally important aspects. Sharing managers often point out
the advantage of having different competencies and being different persons, and
that close communication is necessary.
Various
aspects of principals’ shared leadership have been empirically investigated
over the last three decades, mainly focusing on a variety of potential benefits
such as sustainable working conditions for the principals (Döös et al., 2017a; Eckman & Kelber, 2010), recruitment
advantages (Brooking et
al., 2003; Eckman, 2007)
and democracy (Thomson &
Blackmore, 2006; Wilhelmson
& Döös, 2016).
Literature
searches show that little is published about the downsides. Yet Eckman (2006) points to
difficulties in sharing power, in communicating, defining responsibilities,
developing trust and presenting a unified front. Court (2003) gives an example where a partnership
failed, partly due to the rule that there should only be a single person in the
position, but mainly because of a heavy workload and the difficulties of
cooperating within the co-principal partnership. In general, when sharing
managers run into serious difficulties, there is either a problem in the
internal bedrock or a context that does not recognise and provide the necessary
conditions for this collective way of organising managerial positions (Döös et al., 2013).
The study
is based on five qualitative interviews with people involved in the legislative
process behind the current Education Act.
The
informants were strategically selected from knowledge of people involved in the
process of drafting the Education Act and were complemented with snowball
selection (Aspers, 2011).
All five informants had central positions in the process of developing the
Education Act. Three were non-party civil servants with long experience of
public administration in Sweden. Two were politicians affiliated to two
conservative parties. The informants emphasised that they took part in the work
for a considerable period of time.
A group of
three researchers representing education science, political science and law,
conducted the interviews during 2015–2016. An interview guide was used, and the
researchers took responsibility for different sections; while one carried out
the interview, the other two only listened. Each interview lasted an hour. The
interviews were transcribed.
The
interview material was mainly analysed by the first author, who was not present
during the interviews, and was later discussed and refined with the group of
interviewers. The analysis was a stepwise process that first used open reading
of transcriptions. This served as an orientation and notes were made in the
margins. In the next step, these notes were used to identify preliminary
themes. Next all occurring quotes from the informants related to each theme
were collected. Work on these reply collections focused on a) the work process
which in itself emerged as important for understanding the prohibition, and b)
understanding how and why prohibition came into existence. This formed the
thematic aspects accounted for in the findings. The findings have been
presented at a conference, and peer discussions have been held at two research
seminars.
Specific
quotes were chosen to substantiate the findings. All informants are cited (2–6
times). Participating individuals are kept anonymous; in the presentation of
the findings, each quote is followed only by an anonymous letter representing
the informants (A–E).
The
question of data quality needs to be raised in a study built on what informants
say long after what is being studied took place, in this case, five years or
more. This retrospective factor had both pros and cons for the possibility to
grasp what took place and why. The fact that the interviews were conducted so
long after the drafting of the act might entail problems concerning the study’s
trustworthiness (Graneheim
& Lundman, 2004). It is inevitable that the informants to some
extent did not remember fully what happened, and also remembered incorrectly.
However, the fact that four informants were deeply involved in the work for a
long period indicates that their memories are relatively strong. One held a
manager position, which gave overview but less closeness to the work. Some had
prepared themselves for their interview by consulting documents and brought
with them various documents; they were eager to present correct information.
The reports from the informants are mutually consistent, which contributes to
trustworthiness. The retrospective distance also proved to have the advantage
that the informants talked relatively frankly and the information was, therefore,
probably richer than had the interviews been conducted close to the passing of
the act.
This first
findings section provides a contextual understanding of the work involved in
creating the act and shows the extent of the work; this is important for
understanding how the formal equal authority of joint leadership came to be
prohibited by law.
The
concrete preparation of the 2010 Education Act continued for more than ten
years. However, the informants’ reports go further back to the municipalisation
of schools in 1989–91 and also include the five years’ work after the law had
been introduced. The realisation that the law needed to be totally remade
contributed to this work which, compared to other legislative work, took
unusually long time. The reasons for the total remake were that Swedish schools
were not equally good and that the earlier law was a patchwork that needed to
be modernised. It turned out that the emphasis on one leader’s
responsibility did not emerge in the work on the 2010 act. This was already
proposed in the steering principles introduced in connection with the
municipalisation. A few years later a clarification was made, and the term principal
was introduced around 1994–95. However, these formulations were never clear
enough to hinder joint leadership between principals. After the present act had
come into force, work continued for five years, reviewing what for various
reasons had not turned out so well in the act.
In practice
this was what had not turned out so well in the school law, or what we had not
had time to deal with or, as the lawyers said: ‘We didn’t have time to look at
that, we just took the content from the old school law and moved it to the new
one.’ (B)
In all, there
is a 25-year period of importance for understanding how prohibition of joint
leadership came into existence.
The work
was carried out under different governments using different work forms. The
first big step towards a new law was taken by a Social Democrat minority
government governing with the support of the Green Party. A broad parliamentary
committee was appointed with proportionate numbers of members from different
political parties together with representatives of employers and union
organisations.
At that
time, there was still the idea that politicians would be represented more or
less proportionately, so there were four Social Democrats and others in
proportion accordingly. It was a giant committee. (A)
The school
law committee’s proposal was sent out for consultation, but after that, work
stopped because the government saw no chance of getting enough support for the
law in Parliament. Immediately after the change of government in 2006, when
four non-socialist parties in alliance formed a majority government, work
recommenced. An internal departmental working group was appointed, a much
quicker way of producing a law. It was communicated that its work was largely
based on the school law committee’s proposal, which legitimised not appointing
a new inquiry. Finally, the law was passed by Parliament and came into force.
It is evident that there was a political show for the electoral gallery.
It was seen
as a flop that the previous government, the Social Democrats, had not managed
to present a proposal on this issue. Of course, the opposition had attacked the
government about this, saying, ‘Why don’t you present a proposal?’ So when they
came to power, they simply had to. (B)
The law was
described as a cathedral-building project, a giant project, and the work needed
to complete it was unusually extensive. The official replies to the proposal
were also extensive, 500 in number. “An incredible number of regulations were
to go into the text” (E). The magnitude and the extensive work in itself
resulted in that the room for what was considered less central was greatly
reduced. The closer they got to the goal, the less inclined they were to
question and problematise. It was a matter of reaching the goal where the law
could be presented for a decision in Parliament. This indicates that the extent
of the work was an obstacle to dealing with what were seen as details and
side-tracks. The possibility for principals to share formal authority on equal
terms was too insignificant to be noticed. Furthermore, the work was carried
out in an unusual way with respect to both the highly frequent meetings and the
closeness between officials and politics. The politics involved was not openly
communicated, “from outside it was the civil servants who produced the
proposal.” (D).
The Minister
was very committed to this, we had, in principle, weekly meetings to check developments
during a period of a couple of years. As the work was so incredibly extensive
[…] we had to tick off point after point. (B)
This second
findings section details the five aspects that emerge as significant when
understanding why the prohibition of joint principalship came into existence:
distrust, intentions openly put forward, the late invention of the school unit
concept, delegation as a solution to increased workloads, and notions of
leadership. In all, the five aspects show what was considered important to
achieve as well as the uninformed notions of leadership that implicitly
coloured the process.
The changes
to the law that were of importance for this study were primarily motivated by
the state’s distrust of the municipalities’ ability to run schools. The law was
preceded by a discussion about principals increasingly becoming administrative
managers instead of being pedagogical leaders working out in the schools’
activities. It was regarded important to reverse this trend, and there was
support from all the parties in Parliament for the state to take increased
responsibility for such matters as equality and supervision. The municipal
committees went too far in questions that ought to be the responsibility of the
profession.
Even if it
was not openly stated, there was a feeling that the municipalities had not
really taken their responsibility for schools in full, and the efforts they had
made in many municipalities were, sort of, a bit erroneous and a bit
peripheral. There was very little about results, about the pupils’ learning.
So, of course, that is a way of circumventing the municipalities. (B)
Also, it
was pointed out that there were large upper secondary schools organised in such
a way that it was difficult to know who was responsible. A flora of terminology
had grown up for the person or persons responsible for a certain school. The
distrust of the way the municipalities had managed schools meant that an
important starting point when working on the new law—not
stated openly—was to circumvent the
municipalities by increasing direct state control and governance.Thereby, the
influence of the local political boards and authorities would be reduced.
The legislative
work aimed at getting the principals to focus on being pedagogical leaders
close to the students and the parents. To meet the abovementioned distrust,
there followed the desire to clarify how schools are led. The way chosen, using
clarity as the motive, was to give more direct authority to the principals.
The aim was
to pinpoint the principal to have a person that was to be held responsible. So
here we wanted to have a clearer governing line from the state down to the
principal and to know what the principal’s powers were. The idea was to have
clarity and a demand for responsibility, and that the principal should be a
pedagogical leader. (E)
Thus the
opinion was that the principal needed to be identified as responsible and be
given a clearer and direct mandate by the law. Considerable parts of this had
to do with the students’ legal rights and that these are based on a clear
understanding of who makes the decisions concerning support and disciplinary
measures for a particular student. One expression that recurs in the interviews
about the need for clarity is “one student—one
principal”.
One unclear
point identified was that in various control documents it was stated that the
school was responsible. It was said that this could be understood to mean that
no one felt affected by a certain regulation. Now, the aim was to clearly
identify a particular official in accordance with what was called the
addressee theory.
We called
this the addressee theory—that we needed to be very clear about the addressee of a regulation,
that it was immediately obvious who it hits, so to say. Who is responsible for
following this regulation. Then we had to include the regulation that this
person should be called the principal, so that the addressee principle
would work. (A)
One
informant emphasises in particular that the introduction of the principle of
one single person’s responsibility, came as early as 1990 or 1991. For a long
time, it had been taken for granted that there should be one responsible
person, but that this had not been clearly expressed. The absolute prohibition,
which made joint leadership impossible, came with the new law.
We did not
have a clear regulation until the new law came into force, about if there could
be one or more principals at the same school. (A)
It was an
established issue; it was not a surprise for anybody. (C)
Important
for understanding the consequences for principals’ shared formal authority was
the late invention of the school unit concept. The concept was introduced for
the organisational unit that the single principal was responsible for. The aim
was to achieve clarity. That its inclusion in the law was not properly thought
through was made clear by the informants. It is described as an unintentional
consequence of directly pointing to the principal as responsible, and of the
large number of issues that had to be included in the law. The concept was
introduced during the internal working group’s work at the strong request of
the Minister concerned.
It came
about because we needed to connect a number of other rules to something. (A)
We needed to
define what a school was. So instead we defined school unit because
school can be so many different things. It is easier to create a legal term
from unit. (D)
That the
school unit concept would be of decisive importance for how the function of
principal should be organised in a certain school was not recognised in the
legislative work.
No close
analysis was made of the way the concept of school unit would function in
conjunction with the new regulations for principals. (C)
Afterwards,
the school unit concept created a number of problems, and it was discussed
whether it needed to be revised in the review work on the law. The Swedish
National Agency of Education and the Schools Inspectorate expressed the wish
that it should not be touched.
The new law
meant that the number of tasks specified for the principal increased. That this
meant a considerable escalation of the principal’s workload was realised during
the legislative process. The importance of the principal’s workload not
becoming too heavy that it would be impossible for her or him to cope was
emphasised. Therefore, it was made possible to delegate authority for most
tasks that were addressed directly to the principal. Thus, delegation was the
chosen solution to prevent work overload. However, delegation in itself puts
the intended clarity at risk since the person who delegates is still
responsible for seeing that the work is done properly.
Let’s say
that there are 100 specific decisions for which the principal is responsible.
Then there are at most ten, where it is forbidden to delegate. So the very
great majority can be delegated. […] When the possibility to delegate was
given, a good deal of clarity was lost. It is obvious that it is much clearer
if it is always just the one person. (A)
There was
strong confidence in the legislative work that clarity lies in the fact that
one single person has responsibility. The notions of leadership reflected in
the interviews are built on a conventional and non-problematised capability of
the singular leader. This shows in statements about clarity and confidence in the
capable principal.
Clarity is
that it is one person, that’s it. (C)
A capable
principal makes sure, of course, to have a capable administrative officer to
look after the administration, finances, caretakers, school kitchen, lunchrooms
and that sort of work, so that he or she can focus on what is important. (B)
The
interviews reveal a clear mistrust of leaders being able to share formal
authority on equal footing. An opinion was put forward that delegation of
authority does not in practice differ much from joint leadership.
That [joint
leadership], I believe, is guaranteed to lead to conflict, so I think it’s bad.
(B)
You can have
a management group, so actually, de facto, it’s just the titles that differ
from being able to work closely together. (E)
None of the
informants can remember that in the legislative work there was any criticism of
the principals who had more fellowship or collaboration in their leadership
function; on the other hand, this was not a question that was discussed.
The
presumption was that there was only one principal. I cannot recollect that
there were even any discussions about there being two principals in some
schools. I don’t believe that anyone thought it would be necessary to say that
there had to be one principal. (A)
How shared
leadership between managers is defined by the informants varies significantly.
Research that clarifies the conditions for and the forms of shared leadership
was not used; each person seemed to use his or her own understanding of the phenomenon.
This paper
provides insight into the legislative process behind the current Education Act
(2010:800) in Sweden and aims to shed light on how and why the legislative process
came to prohibit joint leadership for principals. The sharing of a principal’s
position by two people who share formal authority on equal footing is, in
previous research, identified as favourable for principals and schools as it
decreases principals’ often heavy workload. Also, being two at the top of a
school’s organisation means extended possibilities to take part in and
influence ongoing everyday work interactions. Joint leadership has been
suggested as a model for democratic collaboration with the potential to get
spread to other collaborative situations (Wilhelmson
& Döös, 2016).
If so, a distributed leadership, to others than the school leaders, can be the
result. With regard to principals’ importance for student learning and school
outcomes (Böhlmark, Grönqvist, & Vlachos, 2012; Leithwood
& Louis, 2012),
we wanted to know the motives behind the act, as it removed the opportunity for
the principal’s position to be organised with equal formal authority between
two.
As shown,
many years of investigatory work preceded the law, which was described as a
gigantic project, as big as building a cathedral. On the one hand, the legal
prohibition of joint principalship is identified here as an unintended
side-effect of this extensive work. On the other hand, it was completely in
line with uninformed notions of leadership which had a decisive impact on
legislators’ ideas about what was possible, clear and legally correct.
A distrust
in the governing line had a decisive impact on how the new law came to prohibit
joint leadership for principals. This distrust, characterised as a strong
underlying motive, led to legal solutions that circumvented the municipal level
by addressing a number of rules directly to the principal. This lack of trust
may be interpreted as an insufficient interplay between the different levels in
the school system’s governing line, a problem within the Swedish school system
investigated in scientific studies (Nihlfors
& Johansson, 2014;
SOU, 2015:22). Concern about differences in school quality and student equality lay
behind the state’s distrust of the municipalities as expressed in this study.
That the
law was motivated by the state’s distrust of the municipalities’ ability to run
schools was, during the legislative process, referred to as a desire to clarify
how schools are led. The degree of national governance was increased by
reducing the influence of the local municipal organisers. From this followed
the need to focus on one person, the principal, which was motivated by the
addressee theory. However, the intended clarity in terms of responsibility was
again reduced; the introduced rule allowing the principal to delegate, and the
late invention of the school unit concept, created new difficulties in
achieving intended clarity.
The
prohibition of joint leadership fits well into the new public management (NPM)
norm of managerialism, which idealises strong and clear leadership (Madestam, 2017; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). On the one hand, it is quite
understandable that trust in the singular, capable principal left its mark and that
shared leadership did not attract attention; especially so within the already
gigantic work underlying the law.
On the
other hand, the reason that alternative forms of leadership were not identified
as potential options during the legislative process reflects uninformed notions
of leadership. This is an expression of the fact that shared leadership between
managers is an immature phenomenon in society; there is a lack of social
agreement about what it is (Döös, Backström, Melin, & Wilhelmson, 2012; Yankelovich,
1991). Knowledge
provided by research has not been taken aboard on a broad front and have
therefore not strongly affected society. The term social imaginaries (Taylor, 2004) may be used as a way to describe
that the view of leadership of the people involved in the legislative process
is carried in images and stories. Whereas theory is used by a minority (Taylor, 2004), for instance, researchers in a
certain field, social imaginaries refer to a “common understanding that makes
possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (p. 23).
These stand out as rooted in the traditional trust in the singular leader as
strong, competent and clear (Alvesson
& Sveningsson, 2003). In other words, the public narrative (Somers, 1994) of the heroic leader and the
individual capable manager.
Based on
the findings of this study, the legislative process can be seen as an
expression of unreflective and uninformed notions of leadership. This is in
contrast to deliberate consideration based on scientific grounds. Also, in the
Proposition (2016/17:171) for a new Local Government Act, the government
comments on certain objections to having one Chief Executive Officer in
each municipality. The objections submitted for consideration meant that the
bill went too far in steering in detail and in removing the possibility for
municipalities to decide their organisation. The government argued that this is
a necessary restriction of their freedom of organising:
Is there
only one employee who has the leading position among the employees, this
eliminates any possible uncertainties. (Prop., 2016/17:171, p. 196, our
translation)
It is
disturbing and worrying to note that the same arguments as those expressed in
our interviews recur, constantly without scientific support. Furthermore, it
should be expected that as the Education Act prescribes that education is to
rest on scientific grounds and reliable experience, it would itself live up to
the same criterion.
Shared
leadership between managers is not a miracle cure for problems; as with
singular leadership, it is a matter of how it is carried out and under what
conditions. The problem in the school context is that one opportunity was lost
since the principal position may no longer be organised with the formal
authority of joint leadership. The potential of joint leadership has
disappeared (Wilhelmson & Döös, 2018).
The
division of one large school into several school units as a result of the
present law has been shown to cause problems (Döös, Wilhelmson, Madestam,
& Örnberg, 2017b).
It appears to be difficult to deal with the boundary between school units so
that divided schools can become a whole. Research in the Swedish context shows
that shared leadership in other forms than joint leadership continues to exist
in schools (Döös et al., 2017a, 2017b). Sharing forms are being developed
such as functionally shared leadership and vertically invited leadership for
one school unit, as well as horizontally invited leadership between principals,
who thereby cooperate across school unit borders (Döös et al., 2017b). A number of municipal organisers
are testing various collective leadership solutions. This is done to reduce the
principals’ workload and enable them to focus on acting as pedagogical leaders.
We see a
need within the framework of the present law for continuing research on
experiences of shared leadership between managers in various organisational
forms. Also, we suggest research that investigates juridically how the present
law might be changed to facilitate equal formal authority. Two principals on a
par with each other can be responsible together for the whole but still divide
up the tasks according to competence and interest. Thereby they will get
legitimacy in the eyes of both external and internal interests as far as the
school as a whole is concerned; the workload is reduced, and they can freely
take turns and help each other. At the same time, each of the cooperating
principals can have personal responsibility, so that the requirement of one
student—one principal is maintained.
Distrust in
the governing line was a strong contributory factor to the way the law
developed. The fact that the prohibition of joint principalship came into
effect may be reduced to a consequence of the length, forms of work, extent and
political prestige of the legislative process. However, above these
circumstantial explanations stands the ruling public narrative of the heroic
leader and the individual, capable manager; in the cathedral-building project,
there was no intent to question traditional ideas about leadership or
investigate alternatives.
The
important lines of argument concerned lack of trust in the way the
municipalities organised their schools. Direct state control by going via the
principal as the appointed responsible authority was, therefore, the chosen
solution. This, together with the late invention of the school unit concept,
also had unforeseen consequences for the organising of the principal’s
position. In the legislative work, joint leadership was at most a marginal issue.
The principle of singularity ruled, and a ban on joint leadership was the
consequence—without considering whether this
favoured the overarching aims of the law: increased pedagogical responsibility
and leadership with a focus on the students’ learning, results and democratic
upbringing.
Legal
openings still exist for principals’ shared leadership in other forms than the
formal equal authority of joint leadership (see e.g., Örnberg, 2016). As the idea of a super
individual carrying the full weight of responsibility for operating and
developing a school remains, we find it important to shed light on the ideas
and values governing how schools should be organised. The law states the
singularity principle, while leadership in the research literature is
increasingly described as collective. In line with Bolden, Jones, Davis, and
Gentle (2015), we urge an open and critical examination of dominant ideas concerning
organisation and leadership. Society has changed, and it is about time we
seriously question Fayol’s (2008) hundred-year-old rule: only one manager per employee. He regarded it
as an indispensable principle that, if violated, “harms authority, impairs
discipline, disturbs order and threatens stability” (p. 46–47, our
translation). We believe that, based on their local circumstances and needs,
organisers and schools must be trusted to choose their leadership model—singular or shared, divided or united. As
Nihlfors and Johansson (2014) state, responsibility for the results of a school may rest on the
principal as an individual official, but to achieve results the principal needs
to “take and be able to take responsibility and have authority” (p. 234,
our italics). It is unfortunate that the present school law limits the
possibilities for principals to share responsibility—especially
as this issue was not seriously considered and investigated in the legislative
process.
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[1] Corresponding author: marianne.doos@edu.su.se
[2] The research-based concept for a sub-form of shared leadership in managerial positions, characterised by complete formal authority, hierarchic equality and merged work tasks (Döös, 2015).
[3] The same law applies in all essentials to preschools and preschool principals.
[4] Huvudman in Swedish.