Alexander Technique as an auto-ethological mode of differing inquiry

Abstract

In practice, the work of F.M Alexander can sometimes facilitate, enliven or accentuate embodied experience and awareness (Dimon, 2015; Jones, 1976). It can also provide a means whereby the ‘psycho-physical instrument of self’ becomes more readily co-ordinated within its own system of organisation and simultaneously, in relation to whatever it encounters in the world. McCormack’s (2013) reading of Dewey’s “ethology of experience” is salient here, where experience is conceptualised as open-ended, affective, and ‘radically experimental’. Our interest lies in the subtle, barely-perceptible difference/s that sometimes emerge/s when we contemplate/engage a thought, an object, a connection, or an encounter with a freshly-attuned, embodied instrument. Experiencing these differences might also point to some unexplored ways of being in, and coming-to-know, the worlds we inhabit and inquire into.